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[So F. No. 16780. In Bank. Dec. 6, 1944.]

FRED M. BALLINGER, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc.,
Appellant, v. NATIONAlJ FIRE INSURANCE COMP .A..~y OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (a Corporation), Respondent.
.
[1] Dismissal-Effect of NonsuihAs Bar to Subsequent Action.A nonsuit does not prevent another action from being brought
or maintained, and, if pleaded in bar, is not res judicata on
the merits or on any issue other than that of the nonsuit itself.
[2] Insurance-Time to Sue.-An action to recover for loss under
a fire policy was not premature, although filed prior to expiration of the time stated in the policy when the loss would be
payable, where the defendant had unconditionally denied liability, as in such case it would serve no purpose to require
plaintiff to delay suit further.
.
[3] Id.-Time to Sue.-An .unconditional denial of liability by the
insurer after the insured has incurred loss and made claim
under .the policy gives rise to an immediate right of action.
[4] Id. - Contrachlnterpreta.tion-Against Forfeitures. - When
claims on an insurance policy are honestly made, care should
be taken to prevent technical forfeitures such as would ensue
from an unreasonable enforcement of a rule of procedure
unrelated to the merits.
[6] Id.-Pleading-AnSwer or Plea.-Iti an action to recover for
loss under a nre policy, even if the action has been premature,
defendant lost the privilege to urge this defense by failing to
plead it plainly and to assert it promptly.
[6] Id.-Pleading-Answer or Plea-Prematurity. - In an action
to recover for loss under a fire policy, the language of defendant's answer "that neither the whole of said loss nor any part
thereof was or is due, owing or payable to plaintiff ..• or to
anyone at the time of the commencement of this action, at
the present time or at any other time, or at all," was insufficient to raise the issue of prematurity, there being nothing
in the quoted language to put plaintiff on notice of anything
other than 8 general denial of liability under the policy.
McK.Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § 78; [2, 3] Insurance,
§ 239; [4] Insurance, § 61; [5, 6] Insurance, § 257; [7] Continuance, § 10; [8] InsUrance, § 240(2); [9] Insurance, § 240; [10]
Insurance, § 240(1); [11] Limitation of Actions, §§ 99, 102, 132;
[12] Limitation of Actions, § 109; [13] I..im!tation of AotioDB,
HQ, 82; [14] lnAraDee, 133.
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[7] Continuance-Grounds-Party Not Prepared.-WLile courts
are indulgent in granting continuances to litigants to allow
them a reasonable time to prepare for a trial on the merits,
they must also guard against imposition and unrcasonnh)(l.
delays.
[8] Insurance-Limitation of Actiolls-By Policy Provision-Circumstances Excusing Compliance.-Jn an action to recover for
loss under a fire policy, defendant could not successfully rely
on plaintiff's failure to sue within the short limitation period
inserted in the policy where under the circumstances it would
be unjust to prevent a trial on the merits, as where a prior
action had been promptly filed by plaintiff long before the
limitation period expired, and defendant's motion for a nonsuit in that action should not have been granted.
[9] Id.-LimitatioD of Actions-By Special Statutory Provision.The rule of remedial statutes permitting the institution of a
new action after an aetion has been defeated by some technicality unrelated to the merits, has particular force when the
Legislature has shortened the limitation period. While Code
Civ. Proc., § 355, which is the California counterpart of such
statutes, protects a plaintiff who has mistaken his remedy if
he was awarded a judgment in the 1irst instance and defeated
on appeal, the basic policy underlying said section calls for
relief in a caSe where the plaintiff, suing on a fire insurance
policy, has not mistaken his remedy but through error of the
trial court was not allowed to proceed to trial.
[10] ld.-Limitation of Actions-By Policy Provision. - Where
plaintiff brought and diligently pursued an action on a fire
insurance policy within the limitation period prescribed
therein, but defendant obtained numerous continuances and
extensions of time thereby delaying the time of trial until
after expiration of said period, plaintiff should not be deprived of a trial on the merits in a new action involving the
same parties, facts and cause of action, which was promptly
filed after entry of judgment of the nonsuit, because he failed
to seck other remedies in the trial oourt.
[11] Limitation of Actions-Operation and E1fect: SUSpensiOD of
Statute-Absence from State-Disability.-Statutes of limitations are not as ri~,'id as they are sometimes regarded. Under
[8] Limitation of time within which to sue insurers, Dote, 82
A.L.R. 748. Statutes relating to contractual time limitation provisions of insurance poliCies, note, 112 A.L.R. 1288. See, also, 14
Oal.Jur. 599 j 29 Am.Jur. 1043.
[9] Limitation prescribed by insurance statute, Dotes, 23 A.L.B.
97, 106-109; 149 A.L.& 483, 491-492.
.
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certain circumstances property rights or immunities may be
acquired as a result of the running of the statutory period,
but the period will be extended or tolled by the occurrence of
certain events, which may be the subject of conflicting evidence, such as absence from the state or disability.
[12] ld.-Suspension of Statute-Causes not Mentioned in Statute.
-The running of the statute of limitations may be suspended
by causes not mentioneil in tlle statute itself.
[13] ld.-Commencement of Period-Fraud and Mistake.---Frlwdulent concealment by a defendant of the facts on which a
canse of action is based, or mistake as to the facts constituting
the cause of'action, will prevent the running of the period of
limitation until discovery.
[14] Insurance-Appeal-Determination of Cause.-On plaintiff's
appeal in an action to recover for loss uneler a fire policy,
equitable considerations authorized the Supreme Court to grant
relief to the plaintiff, whether defendant insurer violated a
legal duty in failing to disclose its intention to set up a technicaJ defense, or whetllCT it merely sought the aid of a court
in sustaining a plea that would enable it to obtain an unconscionable advantage and enforce a forfeiture.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County. A. F. Bray, ~udge. Reversed with directions.
Action on fire insurance policy. Judgment for defendant
after sustaining of demurrer to complaint without leave to
amend, reversed with directions.
Fred M. Bollinger, in pro. per., Jack J. Miller and Kenneth
M. Johnson for· Appellant.
Long & Levit and Bert W. Levit for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy, brought
this action to recover on a policy of fire insurance issued to
the bankrupt, Kwan Tow. The policy follows the standard
form prescrihed by the Insurance Code, sections 2070 and
2071. It requires the insured to give the insurer written notice of loss without unneceS!;lary delay: to separate the damaged property from that which is unoamagec1 and put it in
the best possible order: to make an inventory statinf! the quantity ano eo!'rt of e.aen item. lind thl:' amollnt claimed thp.reon;

/

)

[13] See 16 Oa1.J'ur. 505; 34 Am.Jur.l29.
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to submit detailed preliminary proof within sixty days after
the fire; to submit -the amount of loss to arbitration if the
insurer does not assent to the amount claimed within twenty
days after receipt thereof -or if an agreement is not otherwise
reached. The policy also provides that "A loss hereunder
shall be payable in thirty days after the amount thereof has
been ascertained either by agreement or by appraisement ... "
and that "No suit or action on this policy for the recovery
of any claim shall be sustained, until after full compliance
by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless
begun within fifteen months next after the commencement
of the fire."
The - complaint incorporates the policy by reference and
alleges that plaintiff was appointed trustee of the bankrupt's
estate on September 20, 1939; that on September 27, 1939,
the property insured was partially destroyed by fire; that on
November 18, 1939. plaintiff and the insured submitted proof
of loss to defendant as required by the policy; that plaintiff
and the insured have performed all the conditions set forth
in the policy; that on December 22, 1939, plaintiff and defendant's _agent entered into an agreement fixing the amount
of loss at $1,160.25: that defendant denied all liability under
the policy on the grounds that at the time of the fire the insured was not the sole and unconditional owner of the insured
personal property, that at the time of the destruction of the
property there was a change in "the interest in, title to, or
possession of the subject of insurance," and that under the
terms of the policy such a change has made the policy void.
The complaint alleges further that on January 15. 1940.
shortly after the plaintiff was advised that the defendant
denied alI liability under the policy, he brought suit in the
Superior Court of San .Joaquin County to recover on the
policy and on defendant's motion the action was transferred
to the Municipal Court of the City and Count~· of San Francisco: that defendant requested and obt.ained from plaintiff
and the court numerous cont.inuances and extenslons of time
thereby deJa~1ng the time of trial until .Tanllary8, 1941: that
after plaintiff presented hiR evidence, defendant moved for a
nonsuit upon the ground that the action had been prematurely
filed because t.hirty days had not elapsed from the time of
agreement l1Pon t11(' amOl1nt of loss: thAt the motion was
granted and judgment upon the nonsuit entered February 21,
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1941; that on February 25, 1941, plaintiff filed the present
action in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County alleging
that plaintiff learned for the first time on January 8, 1941,
the time of trial of the first action, that defendant. was relying upon the defense that the action was premature and that
had he known earlier he would have dismh-;sed that action and
filed a new one within the time permitted by the policy; that
this defense was not set up or disclosed in defendant's demurrer or answer in that action and· that by reason of 'this fact
and the numerous continuances and extensions of time obtained, defendant waived the requirement that suit be commenced fifteen months from the time of the fire. Defendant
demurred, claiming that the action was barred because it
was commenced more than fifteen months after the fire. The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend
and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
This appeal is not from the judgment of nonsuit given in
the municipal court, nor is the purpoae of this appeal or this
decision to attack that judgment conaterally, for its effect as
res judicata on the issue of nonsuit is conceded. [1] A
nonsuit, however, does not prevent another action from being
brought or maintained, and if pleaded in bar is not res judicata on the merits or on any other issue than that of the nonsuit itself. (Gates v. McLe~n, 70 Cal. 42 [11 P. 489] ; Slocum
v. New ·York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 [33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.
Ed. 879].) Plaintiff doe..c; not contend that the municipal court
did not have jurisdiction to try the case or that the nonsuit
is not binding on him but admits its validity and urges this
court to declare that its scope and evidentiary value against
him does not bar his present attempt to secure a hearing on
the merits. The action in which this appeal is taken is essentially the same as that in which the nonsuit wa,s granted, for
the parties, facts, and cause of action are identical, and but for the granting of defendant's motion for nonsuit this action
would not have arisen. The proceedings in the municipal
court cannot be ignored in reviewing the factual background
of this action. They are indeed the very facts and only facts
on which defendant's demurrer must stand or fall. From the
statement of facts in the complaint, which were not denied,
and which, for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer, are
therefore to be taken as true, it clearly appeaJ'R that defendaut's motion for nonsuit should have been denied.
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[2] The action was not premature. Plaintiff, from the
time he succeeded to the rights of the bankrupt under the
policy of insurance upon which this action is founded to the
time of this appeal, faithfully performed all conditionR required of the insured by the terms of the policy. If defendant
had not denied liability the loss would have been payable
under the terms of the policy thirty days after the parties
had agreed upon the amount thereof. Defendant, however.
uneonditionally denied liability, leaving plaintiff no .alternative but to sue to enforce the elaim of the bankrupt. The period of thirty days is allowed an insurance company so that
it will have time to investigate to determine its course of action in response to a claim against it. It may exercise the
option given it in the policy to "repair. rebuild or replace"
the damaged building or machinery "within a reasonable
time" on giving notice of its intention to do 80; it may deeide
to pay the loss agreed upon; or it may detel"IIline that it has
a valid defense to the claim of liability. If an insurance company unconditionally denies lie hility it would serve no purpose to require the in.c;ured to delay <;nit further. AB the court
declared in Paez v. ltfutual Indern. etc. Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.
654, 660 [3 P.2d 69]. "The obviouR purpose of the provision
inhibiting the institution of an action within the sixty-day
period is to permit the eompany to make an investigation of
the circumstances surrounding the loss, but if the company
makes an outright denial of· liability there can be no excuse
for delay in commencing an aetion for the purpose of determining whether the company'!'! claim of nonliability is well
taken. It would be an idle act to insist upon compliance with
the requirement for delay in bringing an action which the
law 'neither doe..c; nor requires.' (Civ. Code, sec. 3532; Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co. r83 Cal. 263 (23 P. 869. 17 Am.St.
Rep. 233) 1 supra.)" [3J The rule is therefore settled in
this court, as in the feoeral and most state courts, that an unconditional denial of liability by the inlnlrer after the insured
has incurred 10RR ann manE' claim nnder the policy gives rise
to an immediate right of at'tion. (Paez v. Mut)Utl Indem. etc.
Ins. Co., supra: Wmiams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 54 C81 442.
448 f35 Am.Rep. 771: f'arroll v. Girard F. Ins. Co., 72 Cal.
297. 299 f13 P. 8631: ~f'/,11.ard v. Legion of HOMr, 81 Cal.
340. 349 r22 P. R641: Pnrnll'nt v. Phoenix InsuranCl! Co .. 83
Cal. 246, 263 [23 P. 869, 17 Am.St.Rep. 233]; McCoUO'Ugh T.

)
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Home Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 659, 663 [102 P. 814, 18 Ann. Cas.
862]; Wilkinson v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 252, 258
[180 P. 607]; Grant v. Sun Indemnity Co., 11 Ca1.2d 438, 440
[80 P.2d 996] ; Lee v. United States Fire Ins. 00., 55 Cal.App.
391, 395-96 [203 P. 774]; 1i'rancis v. /otoa Nat. Fire Ins. Co.,
112 Cal.App. 565. 573-74 [297 P. 122]; Hill v. Mutual Benefit
Health etc. Assn.. 136 Cal. App. 508. 512 r29 P.2d 285]; 1i'ohl
v. Metropolitan lAfe In.~. 00 .• 54 Cal.App.2d 368, 383 [129
P.2d 24] ; Trousdell v. Equitable Life Assur.. Soc., 55 Cal.
App.2d 74, 84 r130 P.2d 173]: see 7 Couch on Insurance
(1930), § 1656b. pp. 5755-56 and Cum.Supp. p. 83, citing cases
in support of the genera) rule from the Supreme Court of the
United States, Canada. and twenty-eight state courts: 5 Joyce,
Insurance, (2d ed.), § 3211: Ch'. Code. § 1440: cf. dictum in
Genuser v. Ocean Accident e.tc. Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 979. 983
[135 P.2d 6701.) The desirability of the rule ill apparent,
for if a waiting period were necessary notwithstanding the
election of the insurer to denv liabilitv. it would become a
trap for the unwary. and would encour~ge dilatory tactics as
in the present case. Inl!in v. Tnsurance Co. of North America,
16 Ca1.App. 143 r116 P. 2941 and Borger v. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 29 CaJ.App. 476 f1!)fi P. 701 aTe therefol'e
disapproved.
The insurance policy incorporated by reference in the complaint is of the usual complexity. While courts are diligent
to protect insurance companie!': from fraudulent claimR and
to enforce all l'eguJationl' necellRary t.o their protection. it
must not be forrmtten that t.he primary funC'tion of insurance
is to insure. [4J When claims are honeRtly made. caTe should
be taken to prevent technical forfeiture.c:: !imch as would emme
from ~n unreasonable enforcement of 1\ rule of procedure unrelated t.o the merit!: (Gran.t v. 81l1! Tnrlemnif11 Co .• lIupra:
Glickman v. Nell' York TAfe Tns. Co .. 16 r.a12d 626 fl07 P.2d
252. 13] A.L.R. 12921: ]3 Appleman. Tmrnrance Law and
Practice (1943). ~ 73Rl). n. ~7: !;ee ~e.U' Y"rk TAfe In.~. Co. v.
Eggleston. 96 U.R 572. 577 r24 L.F-d R411: 7{nn.'1as (!ity TAfe
Tns. Co. v. Pat·is. (C.C.A ~n 9!'i 'F.2d 952. 957: American
Credit Tndemnitll ('0. v. W. 'K. 1fitche.1l c.f: ('0 .. (C.C.A. 3)
7R F.2d 276. 277-78: TJRngmaid tv"i1'l'r and E.~t()'P'Pel in Tnsurunce Law. 20 CaUJ.Rev. 1. 40-41: 7 TT.Pit.t.L.Rev. 14R·!lO).
[6] Defe!ldant's pORit.ion W011 1if nnt he imnrovf'iI hnt1 tl,e
action in fact been pl'emature, for defendant had lost the
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privilege to urge thil< ucJmH,e I)~' faililll~ to pleau it lllainly
and to assert it IJl'Ullll'tJy. Vihllu,'.y ladH·.~ are not favored
by the law, for they waste the court's time, increase the cost
of litigation unnecessarily, and may easily lead to abatement
of an actioll on purely tecJmical grounds after the statute of
limitations has run. (1 C.J.s. Abatement and, Revivai, § 193;
Bemmerly v. Woodwaj'd, ]24 Cal. 568, 574 [57 P. 561]; Realty
& Rebuilding Co.v. Rea, 184 ,Cal. 565 [194 P. 1024J; Seches
v. Bard, 215 Cal. 79 [8 P.2d 835); California 7'horn Cordag,e.,
Inc. v. Diller, 121 Cal.App, 542 f9 P.2d 594].) Defendant's
plea of prematurity, was a dilatory plea in abatement, unrelated to the merits and not asserted for nearly a year after
plaintiff's action was filed. Under these circumstances defendant loses its privilege to raise it.
[6] Defendant contends. howe\,er, that the defense was
properly' pleaded by the following language in its answer:
"that neither the whole of said loss nor any part thereof was
or is due, owing or payable to plaintiff or to Kwari Tow or to
anyone at the time of the commencement of this action, at the
present time or at any other time, or at all. • . . " It cites
cases holding that such a denial is sufficient to raise the issue
of prematurity. None of the cases cited, however, involved Ii
delay so long that the policy limitation period expired or the
failure promptly to assert the defense. There is nothing in
the language quoted to put plaintiff on notice of anything
other than a general denial of liability under the policy. Defendant'lS requests for additional time did not indicate any
intent to rely on premature filing, for extensions of time for
trial are, not necessary to raise the defense of prematurity.
['1] While courts are indulgent in granting continuances to
litigants to allow them a reasonable time to prepare for a trial
on the merits. they must also guard against imposition and
unreasonable delays. (Estate of Bollinger, 145 Cal. 751, 753
[79 P. 427]; Light v. Richardson, 3 Cal.Unrep. 745, 746-47
[31 P. 1123]; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 594a, 595, 596.) Not
only was there nearly a year's delay in the present case but
the nonsuit prevented a trial on the merits.
[8] Under the circumstances it would be a perversion of
the policy of the statute of limitation to deny a trial on the
merits. AB the Supreme Court of the United States declared
in Orurl' of R. Te7rrJrarhers v. Rm71l'all E.-rp. Age7l,c11 (1944).

321 U.S. 342, 348 [64 S.Ot. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788], "Stat-

'J
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utes of limitation •.• in their conclusive effects are designed
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the reviviLl of claims that ha\;e been allowed to-slumber until evi·
dence has ueen lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim
it is unjust not to put an adversary on notice to defend within
the periodqf limitation and the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Here, while the litigation shows no evidence of reckless haste
on the part of either party, it cannot be said that the claims
were not timely pursued." (See; also, 190 Law Times 303-05.)
The short statutory limitation period in the present case is
the result of long insistence by insurance companies that they
have additional protection against fraudulent proofs, which
they could not meet if claims could be sued upon within four
years as in the case of actions on other written instruments
[Code Civ. Proc., § 337). Originally the shortened limitation
periods were inserted into policies by insurers. Some courts
declared such provisions void as against public policy while
other courts enforced them in order to protect freedom of
contract. (See cases collected, 41 Yale L.J. 1069.75.) In reo
fusing to permit a _short limitation period to defeat a claim
that had been brought in good time and diligently pursued,
the court in Genuser v. Ocean Accident etc. Corp., 57 Cal.
App.2d 979, 986 [135 P.2d 670], declared "We assume that
the limitations of time within which suit may be brought which
are commonly found in insurance policies are placed there in
good faith and to serve a wholly proper and meritorious pur·
pose. We do not doubt that experience has demonstrated the
wisdom of providing by contracts of insurance shorter periods
for the institution of actions than those provided by law, but
the purpose of such limitations is to obtain the advantage of
an early trial of the matters in dispute and to make more
certain and convenient the production of evidence upon which
the rights of the parties may depend" but "it is clear to us
that defendant's conduct furnished the occasion for the delay
and that it cannot take advantage of a situation which was
of its own creation." Under the circumstances of the present
case it would be manifestly unjust for this court to prevent
a trial on the merits, which the law favors (Bern v. Rogero,
168 Cal. 736, 741 [145 P. 95]; Waybright v. Anderson, 200
Cal. 374, 377 [253 P. 148]; 13 CalL.Bev. 363), thereby m-
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curr- =- t technical forfeiture of the insured's rights, which the
law L=..::::r;:.rr.ges (Grant v. Sun 111dunnity Co., supra; Glickma't .,.. Jt,-cv.' York Life Ins. Co., supra; see 7 U.Pitt.L.Rev.
14~
:':"" €T~:forcing the fifteen-month limitation period when
the ;':-.i~.~ Htion waR filed promptly and long before the
per:'-.: r~:red.
(9: TD€ htatutes of most states provide that when an actio::. " :1::·::·;:;,ght in good time and diligently pursued, but defea:e<: r;' some technicality unrela1ed to the merits, a new
aet:':r: :lIl£7 be brought within a eertain period, usually six
mot:.~ ~ £ year, which shall be deemed a continuance of the
fon::..e If.!::.:ion. These statutes ha.e their origin in section 4
of tft~ T;n!."':ish Limitation Act of 1623.- (Wood v. Carpenter,
101 L~ 135. 139 [25 L.Ed. 807]; Gaines v. Oity of New York,
215 ~ "! 533. 537 [109 N.E. 594, Ann. Cas. 1916A 259, L.R.A.
1917(: !!DB:.) Although there is a eonflict in the cases where
the T:m:i:.a':ion period is contractual. in the several jurisdictio~. ~t lHchigan, that have adopted a standard form of
~ policy by statute, as California has, it has been
held, ~ these or other remedial statutes designed to prevent
teclmie::t' iorleitures under statutes of limitation also apply
to the- linrl:tntion period ineorporated by statute into every
ins~ poliey. (See eases collected in 23 A.L.R. 97, 106109: ~! AL.R. 483, 491-492.) The reason for such a rule
has '9'~..i~ force when the Legislature has shortened the
li.nL.~ period frorp. four years, eontrolling actions on other
wri~ :ins:roments (Code Oiv. Proc .• § 337), to fifteen months
on ti:r'!: .l:nsI::rance policies (Ins. COO",\ § 2071), since the probabili_. n: "technical forfeiture is 2,3 the greater. The California ~erpart of such statutes i.; section 355 of the Code
of Cbr'i ~dure, copied from sect jon 84 of the New York
Code rr ~edure, which in turn -was based on section 4 of
the F,"T .. ~_ Limitation Act of 1623. (Gaines v. City of New

-x::

a:::

o! the said actions or aurA, judgment be given for the
the IIIlme be reversed by er.:-or, or a verdict· pass for the
. . : upon matter alleged in arrefIt of judgment, the judgment
be g:....
_ ~ the plaintiff, that he tal:.e nothing by his plaint, writ
or bilL ~ r any of the l18id actions be brought by original, and the
defl!!l:lila::r- ~ be outlawed, and ahati &fter reverse the outlawry;
that ;;n. .:. mci:. eases the party plaintiff, ilis heirs, executors or admini~ -= ~ case shall require, may ecmtmence a new action or suit,
from ~ r nme, within a year after IItll!'r. judgm~nt reversed,or such
giTea a M tile plainti1f, or outlawr,y aweri8d, and not after." (11
.1... ~ ~ :If., .. ~)
.Jt:.

p~
p~

zz::::

Dec. 1944]

:SOLLINGER V. NATIONAL FInE INS.
[25 C.2d 399; 154 P.211

Co.

409

39~J

York, supra.) Simplified by the elimination of references to
particular English forms of practice, section 355 provides:
"If an action is commcllced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on
appeaJ, the plaintiff, or if hc die and the canse of action survive, his representatives, may commence a llew action within
one year after the reversa1." If construed literally as applying only in the event of reversals on appeaJ, section 355 would
not give the protection that the English statute afforded to a
plaintiff who had unsuccessfully pursued his right in a previous suit. Even the English statute, however, had to. be supplemented by judicial construction and applied beyond its
literal language to accomplish its purpose. "One may perhaps venture to say that the judges took rather a liberty with
the statute, but I presume the origin of the doctrine is to be
found in the hardship inflicted in particular cases on the litigant or his estate through no fault of his own by a rigid adherence to the terms of s. 4." (Lopes, L.J. in Swindell v.
Bulkeley, 18 Q.B. 250; Hayward v. Kinsey, 12 Mod. 568, 88
Eng.Rep. 1526; Hodsen v. Harridge, 2 Wms.Saund. 64, 85
Eng.Rep. 693; Curlewis v. Mornington, 7 El.&BI. 285, 119
Eng.Rep. 1252; see Gaines v. City of New York, 8'Upra, at
p. 537.)
The New York Court of Appeals in the Gaines ease, speaking through Judge Cardozo, held that statutes that have their
roots in the English statute should be construed with similar
liberality: "We think that whatever verbal differences exist,
the purpose and scope of the present statute are identical in
substance with its prototype, the English Act of 1623.. • •
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the
right to a hearing in court till he reache.s a judgment on the
merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be frittered
away by any narrow construction. The important consideration is that by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely
notice to his adversary of a present purpose to maintain his
rights before the courts." Although the Gaines ease involved
the section of the New York Code of Procedure that succeeded
section 84 of that code from which section 355 of the California Code of Civil· Procedure was taken, the doctrine of construction set forth therein did not rest on the wording of
the new section but on the basic policy of the statute. The
wording of section 355 is reminiscent of the old English statutes that specified situations instead of formulating general
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rules. As presently worded it protects a plaintiff who has
mistaken his remedy if he was awarded a judgment in the
first instancc and defeatcd on appeal. There is all the more
reason to protcct a plaintiff, as ill the preSC!lt case, who has
not mistaken his remedy but through error of the trial cour't
was not allowed to proceed to trial. The basic policy that underlies section 355 calls for relief in such a case. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 4.)
In any event this court is not powerless to formulate rules
of procedure where justice demands it. Indeed; it has shown
itself ready to adapt rules of procedure to serve the ends of
justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably prevent a trial on the merits. (Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Ca1.2d 713 [128 P.2d 522, Hl
A.L.R. 1358]; Ch"istin v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 526 [71
P.2d 205, 112 A.L.R.1l53]; Tuller v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.
352 [10 P.2d 43] ; see 31 Ca1.L.Rev. 225, 227; see, also, Rogers
v. Dukart, 97 Cal. 500, 504 [32 P. 570]; California Constitution, art. VI, § 4lh; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 355, 356, 473, 475;
Civ. Code, §§ 3523, 3528.) The Wennerholm case, supra, is
typical. The Legislature enacted section 472(c) of the Code
of Civil Procedure to do away with the unduly technical rule
that required plaintiff to request leave to amend, even though
the trial court had already sustained a demurrer without
leave to amend, before he could seek appellate review of the
trial court's order. Although the action was pending at the
time of the enactment, the court refused to follow the cases
that had established the technical requirement, thus adopting
the rule in 472(c) before it became law. It was also held
that where amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as
of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is
sought upon the same general set of facts (see, also, cases collected in 16 CaLJur., § 143, pp. 547-548), recognizing that
despite the new filing, the action is still the same. [10] In
the present ease plaintiff brought his action on the policy in
good time and diligently pursued it. The nonsuit was erroneous and unrelated to the merits. But for the unreasonable
delay in bringing the action to trial, the limitation period
would not have expired and ample time would have remained
to file a new action. Since this action is in reality a continuance of the earlier action involving the same parties, facts,
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and cause of action, and was promptly filed after entry of
judgment on the nonsuit, plaintiff should not be deprived of a
trial on the merits be(~ause he failed to seek other remedie:::: in
the municipal court. [11] Statutes of limitations are not so
rigid as they are sometimes regarded. Under certain circumstnnces property rights or immunities may be acquired as a
result of the running of the statutory period, but the period
will be extended or tolled by the occurrence of certain events,
which may be the subject of conflicting evidence, such as
absence from tIle state or disability. (Code Civ. Proc., § 351
et seq.) [12] It is established that the running of the statute of limitations ma~r he suspended by causes not mentioned
in the statute itself. (Bl"aun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wan. (77 U.S.)
218, 223 [1!l hEd. 895J; Collins v. Woodworth, 109 F.2d
628, 629.) [18J It is settled in this state that fraudulent
concealment by the defendant of the facts upon which a cause
of action is based (Kimba.ll v. Pacific Gas db Elec. Co., 220
Cal. 203 r30 P.2d 39J) or mistake as to the facts constituting
the cause of action (Davi.<r etc. Co. v. Advance etc. Works,
Inc., 38 Ca1.App.2d 270 r100 P.2d 1067J; see 16 Cal..1ur. 505)
will prevent the nmning- of the period until discovery.
[14J Principles of equity and justice, which moved this
court in the Kimhnl ease, supra. to grant relief are likewise
controlling here. Th(>re is no need to make fine distinctions as
to the person:::: who owe a dnt.~· to disclose. The Kimball case
invoh'ed an emplo~'er ",ho::::(> fiduciary obligations to his emplo~rees were nn('('ltain. The nresent ea.se involves an insurer
",hos(> dut.\, of gooe'! fRith in dealing with the insured is well
established. (See]~ Appleman. Insurance Law and Practice
37; Vance. In::::uran('(> f1 !l30) 74.) It i:::: likewi::::e unnecessary
t.o dwell upon the contention t.hat the insurer's duty of good
faith to ito; insured arises at the time of contractin~ and persists throughout the period when premiums are paid and no
return is ROllght. hut that- when 8 loss occurs and the insured
Reeks to obtain th(> ('ompensation pro'\Tided in the contract.
t.he parties oeal at arm's leng-th. It is sufficient to hold that
the equitahle eon!':ideration:::: that justify relief in this case
are applicable whether defendant violated a legal duty in
failing to di::::close its intention to set up this technical defense,
or whether it is now merely seeking the aid of a court in sustaining a plea that would enable it to obtain an unconscionable advantage and enforce a forfeiture.
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The judgment is re\'cl'scd with ilircctions to the trial court

to overrule the dcmurrcr.
GiLson, C. J., ShCllh, J., and Cartcr, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Disscnting.-I concur in
the juugment outreach my conclusion upon a different ground
and dissent from certain propositions declared in the majority opinion as hereinafter indicated. That opinion, in effect,
reviews the judgment which was rendered in the municipal
court in the preceding action. I agree with the majority statement by Mr. Justice Traynor that, upon the facts as pleaded
here, it appear~ that in the municipal court action "defend.
ant's motion for nonsuit should have been denied." But con·
cluding that the municipal court erred at that time in. that
action is hnmaterial on this appeal. The fact remains that
the municipal court did grant the motion, did determine that
such action was prematurely brought, and did enter judgment
of dismissal. We have no power, on this appeal from the
judgment of another court in another action, to vacate the
judgment in the previous action in the municipal court. We
cannot revive that action in the guise of sustaining this one.
The only materiality of that one here concerns not what should
have been done but what was done. .
As a secondary basis for its conclusion Justice Traynor's
opinion declares, "Defendant's position would not be improved
had the action [in the municipal court) in fact been premature, for defendant had lost the privl1ege to urge this defense
by failing to plead it plainly and to assert it promptly. •.•
Defendant's plea of prematurity was a dilatory plea in abatement, unrelated to merit..~ and not asserted for nearly a year
after plaintiff's action was filed. Under these circumstances
defendant loses its privl1ege to raise it." (Italics added.)
1 do not know whether Justice Traynor intends to imply that
the trial court in such a situation loses jurisdiction to entertain a special dilatory plea or merely errs in sustaining it.
If he means the former it seems to be a rather drastic innovation of law to promulgate without precedent, and if he
means the latter. then, obviously, his attack on the municipal
court judgment is collateral. Assuming that that court abused
its discretion in entertaining the dilatory plea when it was so
tardily raiscd. neverthI:'1t'R!'I. that court, not thiR one, possessed
the jurisdiction to, and did, pass on the plea. The oclion '"
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the mU1Hcipal coud, erroneously or otherwise, was ended by
the judgment of dismissal. The new action, in which this
appca.l is taken, was not commenced until the complaint in it
was filed. (Coue Civ. Proc., §§ 350 and 405.) That date is
l<'euruary 25, 1941, anu it is with that date we must reckon
in detenninil1g whether the action is barred by the statute
of limitations.
In seeking to avoid the bar the statute here Justice Traynor goes on to declare that "The statuteS of most states provide that when an action is brought in good time and diligently pursued, but defeated by some technicality unrelated
to the merits, a new action may be brought within a certain
period, usually six months or a year, which shall be deemed
a continuance of the former action.• •• In any event, this
court is not powerless to formulate rules of procedure where
justice demands it.••• Since this action is in reality a continuance of the earlier action involving the same parties, fact....
and causes of action, and was promptly filed after entry of
judgment on the nonsuit, plaintiff should not be deprived of
a trial on the merits because he failed to seek other remedies
in the Municipal Court." (ItalicS added.) While legislation such as that which Justice Traynor says "The statutes of
most states provide" would seem desirable under the circumstances of the case before us, the fact remains that in California the statutes do not so provide. I do not feel at liberty
to concur in supplying the lacking legislation. Statutes of
limitation are more than "rule.c:: of procedure." In addition
,to the fact that the prescribing of limitation periods, otherwise
than, by contract, is essentiall~T a legislative function, it iR
the law that parties acquire vested rights through the operation of statutes (or contracts) of limitation when the prescribed period has completely run and even the Legislature
cannot retroactivel~' enlarge a period which has expired. (See
Peiser v. G1-iffi,n (1899),125 Cal. 9,14 [57 P. 690]; Chambers
v. Gallagher (1918), 177 Cal. 704, 708-709 [171 P. 931].)
Hence we have no right to innov,ate the amendment decreed
by the majority opinion and give it retroactive effect.
But there is a sound basis upon pre-existing statutes for
reaching the conclusion that the present action is not barred.
The Legislature has fixed four years (Code Civ. Proc., § 337]
as bt'ing- onlinarily the l·easonable period within which an
action founded upon an instrument in writing shall be
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brought, but by the provisions. of sections 2070 and 2071 of
the Insurance Code has prescribed "fifteen months next after
the commencement of the fire" 8S the period within which an
actfon for the recovery of a claim upon a fire insurance policy
must be instituted. This special limitation is required to be
set forth in every policy and, by reason of such statute, it is
to be deemed included in e\'ery policy, regardless of whether
it is actually written therein. (Sec Brown v. Ferdon (1936),
5 Ca1.2d 226, 230 [54 P.2d 712]; Hates v. Snowden (1937)
19 Ca1.App.2d 366, 369 [65 P.2d 847]; MueUer v. Elba Oil
Co. (1942), 21 Ca1.2d 188. 204 [130 P.2d 961]; Fernelius v.
Pierce (1943), 22 Ca1.2d 226. 243 [138 P.2d121; Baugh v.
Rogers (1944), 24 Ca1.2d 200. 215 [148 P.2d 633].) It derives its effectiveness from the statute. The same statute also
prescribes certain requirements as to notification, proof, ascertainment of loss, and lapse of time, which· must be met
before an action can be "sustained." It specifically provides
that "No suit or action ..• for the recovery of any claim
shall be sustained, untt'l after full compliance by the insured
with all of the foregoing requirements, nor unless begun
within fifteen months next after the commencement of the
fire." (Italics added.)
The meaning of the word "sustained," and the effect of
the clause in which it appears, might be open to argument if
the defendant here had not already committed itself to its
understanding of a definite meaning for that word and the
clause, and enforced that meaning on the plaintiff. This section, on its face, would seem open to the meaning that an action on the policy could be commenced at any time "within
fifteen months next after the commencement of the fire" but
that it could not be "sustained." as by a judgment for plaintiff, until the lapse of the required time, etc. But the meaning attributed to the clause by defendant, and adopted by the
municipal court in granting defendant's motion for nonsuit,
is not merely that an action assertedly prematurely brought
can be abated during the incompetent period and until the
specified requirements have been met, but is, rather, that such
an action must be dismissed. In other words. the position of
the defendant, as invoked in the preceding action, and held
by the court in a judgInent which has become final, is that the
provision in question amounts t{l a .~t(/t1ttory prohibition staying the commencement of the action. Defendant cannot be
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permitted to invoke the benefits of a statutory prohibition
against the commencement of an action on the policy without
also bearing the burden of such statutory prohibition. Section' 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a genera] law of
the state, applicable under the circunlstances shown. It provides that "'Vhen the commencement of an action is stayed
by • ~ • statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of
the . • • prohibition is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." Excluding the time during
which, on defendant's theory, plaintiff was prohibited from
commencing the action, his second complaint was filed in time.
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment of .
reversal.
EDMONDS, J.-Bome months ago, upon an opinion written by Mr. Justice Traynor, this court affirmed the judg.
ment in favor of the insurer. (Bollinger v. National Fire
Ins. Co., -(Cal.) 147 P.2d 611.) I concurred in the decision
and nothing was developed upon the rehearing to change my
views that the applicable law was then correctly applied to
the unControverted facts. The present discussion of my associate omits all reference to the principal contentions of the
parties and places the decision upon a ground correctly
designated by Mr. Justice Schauer all judicial legislation. I
assert with confidence that the rule of procedure which is
now promulgated as justification for reversing the judgment
has no sound legal basis, and I adhere to the principles
which were stated and applied in the former opinion.
In California. all' fire insurance must be written upon a
standard form of policy which. in part, provides: "No suit
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be
sustained, until after full compliance by the insured with all
of the foregoing requirements. nor unless begun within fifo
teen months next after the commencement of the fire." (Ins.
Code. § 2071.) The fire which occasioned the damage for
which the appellant demands reimbursement occurred about
eighteen months before this action was filed. Relying upon
the provision of the statutory policy. the insurer demurred
upon the ground that the action waR begun subsequent to the
expiration of the period of limitation. The trial court sustained the demurrer wit.hout leAve to amend, and entered
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judgment for the insurer. The issue, consequently, concerns . i
the propriety of that ruling.
The language of the policy, the. appellant asserts, must· be
interpreted as permitting an insured to commence an action
within fifteen months from the time the cause of action accrues, which, he declares, is the date "it was first possible to
file a suit under the policy" after the amount of ]oss has been
ascertained. The courts of a small minority of states have
80 construed policy provisions such 9.~ the one required by .
our statute. (Ellis v. Council Bl11.JJs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa 507
[20 N.W. 782]; German Ins. Co. v. Fai)'bank, 32 Neb. 750
[49 N.W. 711, 29 Arn.st.Rep. 459]; Sample v. London etc. F.
1m. Co., 46 S.C. 491 [24 S.E. 334, 57 Arn.St.Rep. 701, 47
L.R.A. 696]; Boston lIlarine Ins. Co. v. Scales, 101 Tenn. 628
[49 S.W. 743] j Hong Sling v. Royal Ins. Co., 8 Utah 135 [30
P. 307]; McFarland &- Steele v. Peabody Ins. Co., 6 W.Va.
425.) The great weight of authority, however, holds that the
clear terms of such a limitation will be enforced and, accordingly, a policy providing that no action will be sustained "unless begun within fifteen months next after commencement of
the fire" simply fixes a period beyond which the insured may
not sue. (Provident Fund Soc. v. Howell, 110 Ala. 508 [18
So. 311] j Daly v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 16 Colo.App. 349
[65 P. 416]; Chichester v. New Hampshire Fire 1m. Co., 74
Conn. 510 [51 A. 545]; Gt.'braltar Fire &- Marine 1m. Co. v.
IAnier, 64 Ga.App. 269 [13 S.W.2d 27]; Maxwell Br08. v.
Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 12 Ga.App. 127 [76 S.E. 1036]; McDaniel v. Gerntan-American Ins. Co., 134 Ga. 189 [67 S.E.
668]; Williams v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 98 Ga. 532 [25 S.E. 31];
Trichelle v. Sherntan &- Ellis Inc., 259 TIl.App. 346; Western
Coal etc. Co. v. Traders Ins. Co., 122 TIl.App. 138; Colonial
Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Ellinger, 112 Ill.App. 302; Oakland Home
1m. Co. v. Allen, 1 Kan.App. 108 [40 P. 928]; State Ins. Co.
of Des Moines v. Stoffels, 48 Kan. 205 [29 P. 479]; Smith v.
Herd, 110 Ky. 56 [60 S.W. 841, 1121] j Owen v. Howard 1m.
Co., 87 Ky. 571 [10 S.W. 119]; Guccione v. New Jersey Inl.
Co. (La.App.) 167 So. 845; Tracy v. Queen City P. Ins. Co.,
132 La. 610 [61 So. 687, Ann.Cas.1914D 1145]; Blanks v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 36 La.Ann. 599; Carraway TI. Merchants Mut.
1m. Co., 26 La.Ann. 298; Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Soc., 68
Md. 465 [12 A. 884, 6 Am.St.R.ep. 460]; Metropolitan Life
;, ... Co. v. Dernpsell, 72 lid. 288 [19 A. 642]; FvZlGm v. N_
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York Union Ins. Co., 7 Ura.)' (1tlas;.) 61 l6G Am.Dec. 462];
Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 380 [25 Am.Rep. 96J i
Dahrooge v. Rochester-German Ins. Co., 177 Mich. 442 l143
N.W. 608, 48 L.R.A.N.S.906ji Shackett v. People's Mut. Ben.
Soc., 107 Mich. 65 [64 N.W. 8751; Peck v. German F. Ins. Co.,
102 Mich. 52 [60 N.W. 453]; Rottier v. German Ins. Co., 84
Minn. 116 [86 RW. 888]; Willoughby v. St. Paul German
Ins. Co., 68 Minn. 373 [71 N.W. 272]; Grigsby v. German
Ins. Co., 40 Mo.App. 276; Bradley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo.
App. 7; Glass v. Walker, 66 Mo. 32; Ignazio v. Fire Assn. of
Phila., 98 N;J.L. 602 [121 A. 456]; Electric Gin Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 39 N.M. 73 [39 P.2d 1024]; Biloz v.
Tioga etc. Assn., 21 N.Y.S.2d 643 [affd. 23 N.Y.S.2d 460];
Hammon v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 327 [50 N.E. 863, 42
L.R.A. 485]; King v. Watertown F. Ins. Co. 47 Hun.
(N.Y.) 1; Rouse v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 203 N.C. 345 [166
S.E. 177]; Welch v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 192 N.C. 809 [136_
S.E. 117]; John Tatham ct Co. v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 181
N.C. 434 [107 S.E. 450]; Travelers'
Co. v. California
Ins. Co., 1 N.D. 151 [45 N.W. 703, 8 L.R.A. 769]; Appel v.
Cooper Ins. Co., 76 Ohio 52 [80 N.E. 955, 10 Ann. Cas. 821,
10 L.R.A.N.S. 674]; Lucas v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia (Ohio
App.), 42 N.E.2d 674; United States P. Ins. Co. v. Swyden
175 Okla. 475 [53 P.2d 284]; Camden F. Ins. Assn. v. Walker,
111 Okla. 35 [238 P.462]; Wever v. Pioneer F. Ins. Co., 49
Okla. 546 [153 P. 1146]; Egan v.Oakland Home Ins. Co., 29
Ore. 403 [42 P. 990,54 Am.St.Rep. 798]; Miners Savings Bank
v. Merchants F.Ins. Co., 131 Pa.Super, 21 [198 A. 495]; Howard Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 130 Pa. 170 [18 A. 614]; Schroeder
v. Keystone Ins. Co. (Penn.), 2 Phila. 286; Braunstein v.
North River Ins. Co., 62 S.D. 561 [255 N.W. 463]; Kroeger
v. Farmers'Mut. Ins. Co., 52 S.D. 433 [218 N.W. 17]; Schlitz
v. Lowell Mut. P. Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 334 [119 A. 516]; Morrell
ct Co. v. New England P. Ins. Co., 71 Vt. 281 [44 A. 358];
Virginia F. ct M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736 [3 S.E. 349];
Virginia F. ct M. Ins. Co. v. Aiken, 82 Va. 424; Hefner v.
Great Am,er. Ins. Co~, 126 Wash. 390 [218 P. 206]; State
Ins. Co. v. Meesman, 2 Wash. 459 [27 P. 77, 26 Am.St.Rep.
870]; Har' v. Citizens Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 77 [56 N.W. 332, 39
Am.St.Rep. 877, 21 L.R.A. 743]; McFarland v. Railway etc.
Accidfmt ..4.ssn., 5 Wyo. 1~~ [38 P. 347, 677, 63 Am.St.Rep.
29, 27 A.L.R. 48].)
The decisions in California follow this rule and hold tAM an
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insured must begin his action within fifteen months from the
date of loss. (Tebbets v. Fidelity If Casualty Co.; ]55 Cal.
137 [99 P. 501]; Garido v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 2 Cal.
Unrep.560 [8 P. 512); Harlow v. American Eq1litab7e Assur.
. Co.,87 Cal.App. 28 [261 r. 490]; Fitzpatrick v. North Amencon Ace. Ins. Co., 18 Cal.App. 264 [123 P. 209].) The appellant insists, however, that in Case v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal.
473 [23 P. 534, 8 L.R.A: 48), the court followed the minority
role. But in tllat case the insurer exacted compliance with
policy provisions which required thirteen months to complete
although the contract restricted the commencement of an
action to "within twelve months next after the fire shall
occur." Under those circumstances the limitation was held
unenforceable. A similar situation was shown in Bennett v.
Modern Woodmen, 52 Ca1.App. 581 [i99 P. 343], because
giving lite!'al effect to the insurer's by-laws, the remedy of
the beneficiary was suspended until the organization rejected
her claim although the period of limitation was then running.
Otherwise stated, the by-laws which the insurer there relied
upon gave it the opportunity to delay action until the period
of limitation had expired.
In the present case, less than nhiety days after the :fire the
appellant and the insurance company agreed upon the amount
of the loss whicll, by the terms of the statutory policy, was
payable thirty days thereafter. The present action was commenced about eighteen months after the date· of the :fire and
thirteen months after the loss was payable. Moreover, had
the insurance company exacted full compliance with every
provision of the policy, the amount of the loss would have
become payable not more than five months after the :fire, and
the limitation of fifteen months for the commencement of an
action gave the insured ten months in which to sue. In other
words, by the tcrlDS of the policy contract, the time for bringing an action could not have been reduced to less than ten
months. and because in the present case the amount of the loss
was promptly agreed upon, the insured had thirteen months
within which to pursue his remedy..
.
Certainly this situation is entirely different from that shown
in either Case v. Sun 1m. Co., supra, or Bennett v. Modern
Woodmen, supra, and it affords no justification for applying
\he doctrine relied upon by a few courts for the purpose of
~ from policy provisions whieh unduly shortened the
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period of limitation by !Joliey covenants. (See 41 Yale hJ.
lOG!>.) In n numher of states the IJegislatul'e has adopted
a statute either prohibitillg ~\Jly limitation by contract or
providing for a sj.ecifie(l time aft('r accrual of the C[!llse of
action for the (,OlIlJ:1Cllecmellt of the' nction. But ill jnrisdictions having no st::tll!()J'Y proldbitiol1 ng-ainst policy limitations, the rnle is tlwt altllOl1;!,'h pal'ties to 'n contract may ag-ree
upon a limitation pClioa less than that pro\'i<1c(l by statute
generally, a reasonable time must be allowed for the commencement of an action. (Tebllets v. Ficlelity d'; Casua7ty Co.,
supra; Fitzpatrick v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., slIpra;
Harlow v. American Equitable A.sS1tr. 00., supra: Beeson Y.
Schloss, 183 Cal. 618 [J92 P. 292]; Pageol T. &- O. Co. v.
Pacific Indemnity Co., 18 Ca1.2d 748 [117 P.2d 669].) According to the doctrine of these cases. the form of policy required by the Insurance Code of this state (§ 2071) unquestionably provides for a reasonable period within which to sue.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor, it is implicitly admitted that, under ordinary circumstances, an action must be
commenced within fifteen months after the date of the fire,
and that the limitation is not unreasonable. There is the further implication that the insurer is not estopped, nor did it
waive the right to assert that the present action is barred.
However, the opinion avoids the consequence of the principles
formerly deemed controlling by formulating a rule of procedure heretofore unknown in this state, to the effect that when
an action is brought in good time and diligently pursued, but
defeated by some technicality unrelated to the merits, a new
action may be commenced within a reasonable time, which
shall be deemed a continuance of the former action. The asserted basis for such relief is that the legislative enactments
of several states so provide, and the justification for its adoption by this court is said to be that in the present case the end
to be achieved justifies the means. Judicial decision should
not rest upon that doctrine.
Admittedly the appellant finds himself in unfortunate circumstances. But those circumstances were of his own choosing and his plight is no different from that of a multitude of
litigants against whom this court has applied clear rules of
law. And contrary to the intimation. raised by dictum in the
majority opinion, the appellant's position was not occasioned
by any unreasonable conduct of the insurer. Although it is
said that the situation of the plaintiff at the present time
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is attributable to the improper ruling of the trial court in
the 'original action granting the insurer's motion for a nonsuit, the record sho;'vs no allegation nor ,claim by him that
the company obtained extensions of time for the designed
purpose of causing the period of limitations to expire, that
the continuances were improper or not for good causc, or that
the insurer affirmatively misled him by lulling him into a
sense of false security.
On the contrary, it. appears that the appellant, an attorney
at law, consented to the continuances granted the company.
He is charged with notice of the provisions of his policy
(Madsen v. Ma1'yland Casualty Co., 168 Cal. 204 [142 P. 51] ;
Rice v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 21 Cal.App.2d
660 [70 P.2d 51(j]) and the state of the law governing his suit.
Implicit in the present holding of Mr. Justice Traynor, however, is the assumption that in some unspecified manner the
insurer took unfair advantage of the appellant and, consequently, justice demands that this court create a remedy. The
so-called "factual background of this action," warrants no
such assumption; on thc contrary, controlling principles compel the conclusion that according to settled rules of law the
insurer took no undue advantage of Bollinger. He and the
insurance company were adversaries in an action at law and
as such entitled to dcal at arm's length. The company was
under no duty to warn Bollinger that his action would be forfeited if he did not commence a proper action within the time
limited by the policy (Fleishbeinv. Western Auto S. Agency,
19 Cal.App.2d 424 [65 P.2d 928]; W~'lhelmi v. Des Moines
Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 532 [72 N.W. 685]; Howard Ins. Co. v.
Hocking, 130 Pa.St. 170 [18 A. 614]; Travelers' Ins. Co. v.
California Ins. Co., supra) nor to warn him that it intended
to rely on strict enforcement of the policy provisions. The
rule that the insurer and the insured owe each other a high
degree of good faith in contracting (Vance on Insurance (2d
ed., 1930), pp. 74-75) does not in any sense affect their position as adversaries in a court of law for, in litigation, they
face each other in an entirely different capacity having entirely different incidents.
Unquestionably Bollinger chose to follow a course by which,
according to the former rule of decision in this state, he lost
his right of action. I concur in the conclusions of Mr. Justiee
Schauer that the ruling in the first suit brought by Bollinger
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is immaterial to the present litigation and that this court
should not couutenance a collateral attack upon the former
judgment of nonsuit. But if it is to be considered, as statcd
by 1\1r. Justice Traynor the determination was incorrect, beCtiUSe "an unconditional denial of liability by the insurer
after the insured has incurred loss and made claim under tIle
policy gives rise to an immediate cause of action." Bollingcr
therefore had an effective remedy by appeal which he did not
invoke. Instead of doing so he commenced the present action,
alleging that by its conduct the insurer waived the right to
rely upon the provisions of the policy, and the court now
devises an extraordinary remedy to relieve a litigant who in·
stead of taking an appeal from an erroneous judgment, sued in
another ·court upon the same claim.
The rule now applied is said to be one of procedure, but it
determbes the substantive rights of the parties and, in addition, operates retroactivel:" to interfere with vested rights
acquired by virtue of the term of the policy contract and th!'
Insurance Code. And if the remedy is a part of the common
law, it certainly directly conflicts ",..ith constitutional anu
statutory provisions. To me. the question for decision is
readily determinable by fundamental principles which have
long been recognized and applied. Accordingly, and even
more particularly for t.he reasons well stated by Mr. Justice
Traynor upon the prm-ious decision of t.his case, I am of the
opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

--)

Curtis, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January
4, 1945. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a

rehearina-

J

